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During the last two decades, scientists have grown increasingly aware that viruses
are emerging from the human–animal interface. In particular, respiratory infections are
problematic; in early 2003, World Health Organization issued a worldwide alert for a
previously unrecognized illness that was subsequently found to be caused by a novel
coronavirus [severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus]. In addition to SARS,
other respiratory pathogens have also emerged recently, contributing to the high burden of respiratory tract infection-related morbidity and mortality. Among the recently
emerged respiratory pathogens are influenza viruses, coronaviruses, enteroviruses,
and adenoviruses. As the genesis of these emerging viruses is not well understood
and their detection normally occurs after they have crossed over and adapted to man,
ideally, strategies for such novel virus detection should include intensive surveillance at
the human–animal interface, particularly if one believes the paradigm that many novel
emerging zoonotic viruses first circulate in animal populations and occasionally infect
man before they fully adapt to man; early detection at the human–animal interface will
provide earlier warning. Here, we review recent emerging virus treats for these four
groups of viruses.
Keywords: emerging viruses, respiratory viruses, influenza viruses, adenoviruses, coronaviruses, enteroviruses,
one health

INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, scientists have grown increasingly aware that viruses are emerging
from the human–animal interface. In order to combat this increasingly complex problem, the One
Health approach or initiative has been proposed as a way of working across disciplines to incorporate human, animal, and environmental health. Of particular concern are emerging respiratory
virus infections; in a recent seminar given by the National Institute of Health on emerging and
re-emerging pathogens, nearly 18% were respiratory viruses (1). Among the recently emerged respiratory pathogens contributing to the high burden of respiratory tract infection-related morbidity
and mortality, displayed graphically in Figure 1, are influenza viruses, coronaviruses, enteroviruses
(EVs), and adenoviruses (Ads). In this report, we summarize the emerging threat characteristics of
these four groups of viruses.
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Figure 1 | The geographical location of first detections (with known reservoirs) for recently emerged adenoviruses (Ads), enteroviruses (EVs), coronaviruses, and
influenza viruses. Zoonotic (coronaviruses and influenza viruses) and non-zoonotic viruses (Ads and EVs) are shown. For zoonotic viruses, the hosts range from
cattle, bats, chickens, camels, wild birds, cats, ferrets, goats, and humans (from left to right). The different sizes of the circles represent the number of human cases
during the first outbreaks of the emerging respiratory viruses. Human cases of adenoviral infections are shown in blue; human cases of enteroviral infections are
shown in yellow; human cases of coronaviral infections are shown in green; and human cases of influenza viral infections are shown in red.

Influenza A

ZOONOTIC INFLUENZA

Swine Influenza
H3N2

Introduction and Epidemiology

Influenza viruses are RNA viruses that are members of the orthomyxovirus family and classified into four types: A, B, C, and D (2).
As shown in Table 1, these four types of viruses are characterized
by their immunologically distinct nucleoprotein and matrix protein antigens. Influenza A and B viruses consist of hemagglutinin
(HA), which binds a sialic acid receptor, allowing the virus to enter
the host cell, and neuraminidase (NA), which cleaves the sialic acid
to release the virus. Similarly, influenza C and D viruses contain
HA-esterase fusion glycoproteins that also allow for the attachment of viral and cellular membranes. Antigenic shifts (influenza
A only) in HA, NA, and the HA-esterase proteins contribute to the
generation of novel viral strains. The host range of influenza viruses
includes humans, birds, pigs, bats, and other livestock animals
such as cattle and goats. The network of the influenza viral transmission is complex with both inter- and intraspecies transmission.
As the viruses continue to change in their genetic sequences,
ongoing research is imperative in investigating the ecology of these
viruses at the human–animal interface to control further spread of
infections and prevent the risk of future pandemics.
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Influenza A virus H3N2 subtypes are frequently reported in
swine, avian, and canine hosts that are responsible for highly
infectious respiratory diseases in pigs and have been examined
as a potential cause of influenza in humans. One study, examining the role of IAV in pigs at USA agricultural fairs, reported an
average influenza A prevalence of 77.5% among 161 swine across
all seven fairs (3). The genomic sequences of the viruses isolated
from the swine were ≥99.89% similar to the H3N2 viruses isolated
in humans. At these fairs, IAVs were detected at least 1 day before
symptoms of the virus were observed in humans, indicating that
H3N2 was transmitted from pigs to humans in this case.

H1N1

Since 2009, H1N1 virus has posed a significant threat to livestock
workers and the greater community and has now become a seasonal
influenza virus which circulates in humans. To explore the role of
swine production facilities in the development of new swine-like
influenza viruses, the spatiotemporal association between weekly
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Table 1 | Characteristics of influenza viruses.
Characteristics
Virus structure

Influenza A

Influenza B

Enveloped
Eight gene segments
Hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) glycoproteins

Influenza C

Influenza D

Enveloped
Seven gene segments
HA–esterase fusion glycoprotein

Epidemiology

Antigenic shift and drift

Only antigenic drift

Only antigenic drift

Only antigenic drift

Known hosts

Domestic and wild animals and avian species

Humans, pigs, and seals

Humans and pigs

Humans and livestock (cattle,
pigs, and goats)

Clinical manifestation

Pandemic potential could cause high mortality

Can cause severe disease
in elderly and high-risk
populations

Mild seasonal disease
predominantly in children

Mild disease in humans
across ages

Available diagnostics
Treatments

Rapid diagnostic tests (i.e., antigen detection); rapid molecular assays
(nucleic acid detection); immunofluorescence; and cell culture
NA inhibitors: zanamivir, oseltamivir, and peramivir.
Laninamivir investigational in USA
.
Adamantanes: amantadine and rimantadine (not
recommended in USA due to resistance)

NA inhibitors: zanamivir,
oseltamivir, and peramivir.
Laninamivir investigational
in USA.

influenza-like illnesses (ILIs) in humans and the location of pig
farms was investigated in North Carolina over four influenza
seasons (4). Analyses showed that the years of H1N1 pandemic,
2009–2010 and 2010–2011, were closely related with earlier peaking of ILI cases. These findings suggest that increased exposure
to pigs was associated with earlier observations of the greatest
number of human H1N1 cases.
In China, the transmission of influenza A between humans
and pigs in six farms is being examined using a One Health
approach, taking into consideration the interconnectedness of
humans, animals, and the environment (5). Findings suggest
that both A(H1N1)pdm09-like and swine-lineage H1N1 and
swine-lineage H3N2 viruses are circulating in swine workers
and that these viruses likely reassort and cross species within the
pig farms; as such, additional research is needed to understand
the relationship between cross species transmission of viruses in
humans and pigs.

H7N9

Avian Influenza

Influenza D

Supportive symptom
management

Supportive symptom
management

H7N9 virus, a sporadic subtype of an avian influenza A virus, was
first reported in humans in China in 2013. Since the first outbreak,
China has been experiencing epidemics annually, with a cumulative number of 1,562 reported cases, 40% of which have led to deaths
as of September 2017 (10). The incidence of the H7N9 infections
has been increasing in both humans and poultry and in 2017 alone
764 infections have been reported (11). Although H7N9 was first
recognized as a low pathogenic avian influenza, two divergent lineages were detected in 2016—including a highly pathogenic avian
influenza variant (12). According to the Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), H7N9 is now recognized as the virus with
the greatest potential to cause a pandemic due to its rapid genetic
changes over the last 5 years. This further supports the need to
improve disease control strategies and increase efforts to develop
an effective vaccination strategy in the future as the spread of the
H7N9 infection poses a threat to the poultry business.

Avian influenza viruses are the largest group of influenza
A viruses reservoired in aquatic birds or poultry. Although
infrequently transmitted to humans, many cases have now been
reported. Human infection with avian influenza can lead to
serious health conditions, including death. The first outbreak of
an IAV strain, H5N1, in humans occurred in Hong Kong SAR,
China, in 1997, infecting 18 humans (6). The first identified
cases of human infection with H7N2, another avian influenza,
occurred in North America with two human cases reported in
2002 (7). Another variation of the virus, H7N7, was the first
avian influenza strain reported in Europe; it infected 89 humans
in 2003. In 2004, the first human cases of H10N7 infections were
observed in Africa (8). It is important to note that H5N1 virus
outbreak occurred again in 2004, 7 years after its first outbreak
in humans, infecting more than 650 humans and causing more
than 386 deaths worldwide (9). The avian influenza viruses have
continuously evolved, causing serious infections among humans
across the world.

Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org

Real-time PCR and cell culture

Influenza D virus (IDV) is a novel influenza virus that is structurally different from the other influenza viruses. IDV was first
isolated in 2001 from pigs in USA and since the first report, viral
infection has been reported in various locations in USA, Europe,
and Asia. In a serological study, cattle workers and non cattleexposed adults in Florida were screened for IDV antibodies (13).
Of the cattle workers, 97% of IDV seroprevalence was observed,
while less than 20% was observed in non-cattle-exposed adults,
suggesting a greater risk of IDV infection for cattle workers.
During a swine respiratory disease outbreak in Northern Italy
in 2015, the IDV genome was detected and isolated in both pigs
and cattle herds (14). The viral genome isolated from the pigs
was closely related to the viral genome isolated in USA in 2011.
Additionally, the archived serum samples from 2009 had lower
IDV antibody titers compared to the serum samples collected in
2015. These findings suggest that the incidence of IDV infections
in pigs may have increased over time, and therefore, IDV may
pose a public health threat to the community.
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ZOONOTIC CORONAVIRUS

MERS-CoV. In a study conducted between 2014 and 2015 in
Saudi Arabia, researchers found that dromedary camels share
three CoV species with humans, including betacoronavirus 1,
MERS-COV, and a CoV 229E-related virus (23). With the aim of
reducing MERS-CoV transmission to humans, Haagmans et al.
developed a vaccine for camels using a poxvirus vehicle (24). This
vaccine has significantly reduced virus excretion among camels
and conferred cross-immunity to camelpox infections (25).

Introduction and Epidemiology

Coronaviruses are single-stranded, RNA viruses with a large
genome in which mutations are very common. There are six
human types of coronavirus: 229E, OC43, NL63, HKU1, which
are often associated with mild upper respiratory tract infections,
as well as the virus causing severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS-CoV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERSCoV), both of which are zoonotic and have previously caused
human disease. Interspecies transmission and the resulting
emergent coronaviruses have been important factors in emerging
respiratory disease as coronaviruses are known to infect feline,
swine, canine, and bat species. Both MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV
emerged from animal reservoirs and are now increasingly important respiratory virus threats.

ENTEROVIRUSES
Introduction and Epidemiology

Enteroviruses are small, positive-sense, single-stranded RNA
viruses in the Picornaviridae family. There are 12 species of EVs
found globally, including EV A-J (EV-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and J)
and rhinovirus A–C (RV-A, B, and C). With low replication fidelity and frequent recombination, EVs have viral genetic diversity
and a potential for cross-species infection. In February 2013,
the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV)
approved changes to EV and rhinovirus species names after many
of the human EV species were identified and isolated in nonhuman hosts. Based on an analysis of Picornaviridae hosts listed
in the ICTV database and subsequent studies of EV infection
in non-human primates, there is growing evidence to indicate
a potential for future zoonotic transmission between animals
and humans (26, 27). Among the most important emerging respiratory viruses are EV68, EV71, coxsackieviruses, echoviruses,
rhinoviruses, and polioviruses.
Enterovirus transmission occurs year-round, with seasonal
peaks occurring in the summer and fall (June–October). Infants
less than 1 year of age are most susceptible to infection, and males
are at an increased risk for infection until the age of 20 years (28).
The predominant mode of transmission is through a direct or
indirect fecal–oral route; however, certain serotypes are transmitted via the respiratory route, in tears, and via fomites (29).
Immunity to EVs is serotype specific with most causing mild
respiratory infections.

SARS-CoV

SARS-CoV first emerged as a global problem in 2003, when
China informed the World Health Organization (WHO) of 305
cases of atypical pneumonia in Guangdong Province. The WHO
estimates that a total of 8,098 people worldwide became sick
with SARS-CoV during the 2003 outbreak, and of them 774
died (15). In USA, only eight people had laboratory evidence
of SARS-CoV infection and, in all cases, infection was travel
related. The secondary spread of SARS-CoV was characterized
by transmission between patients and nurses, requiring intervention from hospital infection control (16). Horseshoe bats are the
host reservoir for SARS-CoV, but it is also postulated that other
intermediate hosts such as civet cats, domestic cats, rodents,
and swine may play an important role in transmission (17, 18).
Recently, it has also been suggested that bats may play a role in the
direct human transmission as bat SARS-like coronaviruses have
been identified in some species (19).
In the past decade, teams from the Sabin Vaccine Institute
and Baylor College of Medicine have been working toward the
development of a vaccine for SARS-CoV. Although initial reports
indicated that a vaccine may be ready for human clinical trials in
2017, progress has been slow and few human SARS vaccine trials
have been conducted to date.

Rhinoviruses

Rhinoviruses are small, single-stranded RNA viruses in the
picornavirus family that are responsible for more than half of all
upper respiratory tract infections. In addition to exacerbating
asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, rhinoviruses
have also been associated with acute respiratory hospitalizations
among children (30). In a large prospective study of US pneumonias, rhinoviruses have been identified as the second most
prevalent etiology of pneumonia in children after respiratory
syncytial virus and the first most common etiology among adults
(31). There are more than 150 unique types of rhinoviruses.
Among the three genotypes (A, B, and C) types A and C are most
often associated with increased morbidity and bacterial secondary infection. In animals, rhinovirus type C has been associated
with morbidity in chimpanzees (32). With an array of unique
serotypes no vaccines or approved antiviral therapies have been
commercially produced; however, experiments have suggested
that vaccines and antiviral therapy may be possible (33, 34).

MERS-CoV

Middle East respiratory syndrome was first recognized in Saudi
Arabia in 2012. Many cases were linked to travel to or residence in
countries in and near the Arabian Peninsula. Symptoms include
severe acute respiratory illness with fever, cough, and shortness
of breath. There is limited human-to-human transmission of
MERS-CoV, but exposure to camels is a risk factor for infection,
with seroprevalences 15–23 times higher in camel exposed individuals (20). Despite this, major health care-associated transmission of MERS-CoV was reported in the Middle East and Korea,
with outbreaks characterized by interhospital spread related to
overcrowding and a lack of personal protective equipment (21).
The total number of worldwide cases reported to the WHO as of
January 9, 2017 was 2,067 MERS-CoV cases (22).
The cocirculation of CoVs in its animal reservoirs (camels
and bats) raises important questions about the evolution of
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EV D68

burden, which accounted for the prevention of approximately 1
death, 1,100–2,700 hospitalizations, and 13,000 febrile Ad cases
per year among trainees (44).

Enterovirus D68 has caused sporadic respiratory disease outbreaks across Asia, Europe, and USA since 1960s; however, in
2014, a nationwide outbreak of D68 was associated with severe
respiratory illness in USA, resulting in 14 deaths out of a known
1,150 cases (35). The CDC found 36% of all EVs tested during
this outbreak were D68 and that patients with a history of asthma
were found to be at a disproportionately increased risk of infection (36). One study of the 2014 outbreak found 59% of patients
seen with EV-D68 in hospitals across Missouri, Illinois, and
Colorado were admitted to intensive care units and 28% received
ventilator support (35). In a study evaluating EVs in non-human
primates, EV-D68 was detected as a recombinant zoonotic
strain (37).

Emerging Ads

Outbreaks of Ad in the general population have been characterized by infection due to novel viruses such as Ad7h, Ad7d2,
Ad14a, and Ad3 variants. These novel viruses are sometimes associated with high attack rates and a high prevalence of pneumonia.
Severe mortality is also prevalent among patients with chronic
disease and in the elderly.
One of the most important novel serotypes, Ad14, previously
rarely reported, is now considered as an emerging Ad type causing severe and sometimes fatal respiratory illness in patients of
all ages (45). Beginning in 2005, Ad14 cases were suddenly identified in four locations across USA (46); the strain associated with
this outbreak was different than the original Ad14 strain isolated
in 1950s. The novel strain, Ad14a, has now spread to numerous
US states and is associated with a higher rate of severe illness
when compared to other Ad strains.
Novel Ad species have also been recently detected in crossspecies infections from non-human primates to man in USA
and between psittacine birds and man in China (47). These
cross-species infections indicate that Ads should be monitored
for their potential to cause cross-species outbreaks. In a recent
review of the risks of potential outbreaks associated with zoonotic
Ad (48), it was noted that intense human–animal interaction is
likely to increase the probability of emergent cross-species Ad
infection. Additionally, the recombination of AdVs with latent
“host-specific” AdVs is the most likely scenario for adaptation to
a new host, either human or animal.
Currently, there are no FDA approved antivirals for Ad
infection; however, the best antiviral success has been seen with
ribavirin, cidofovir, and most recently brincidofovir an analog of
cidofovir (49).

Enterovirus 71 (EV71)

While there are several strains of coxsackievirus and EVs that
can cause hand-foot-and-mouth disease (HFMD), EV71 is most
commonly associated with severe disease outcomes. HFMD
predominantly affects young children and is found worldwide
but especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Although EV71 is not
typically detected in animals, recent research has indicated that it
infects non-human primates (38). Various antiviral therapies are
currently under study, including small molecules, monoclonals,
and antivirals. Vaccine candidates are also in development, with
two vaccines currently available in China, which involve recombinant proteins, attenuated strains, inactivated whole-virus and
virus-like particles, and DNA vaccines (39).

HUMAN Ad
Introduction and Epidemiology

First discovered in 1953 by Rowe et al., Ads are non-enveloped,
double-stranded DNA viruses with 57 unique serotypes, some of
which are specific for attacking the respiratory track, conjunctiva, or gastrointestinal track (40). Key features of Ad infections
include various symptoms of disease, including rhinorrhea, nasal
congestion, cough, sneezing, pharyngitis, keratoconjunctivitis,
pneumonia, meningitis, gastroenteritis, cystitis, and encephalitis. Illnesses may be asymptomatic, mild, or severe; however,
immunocompromised patients and infants are at increased risk
of severe morbidity and death.

CONCLUSION
As it is clear that many emerging respiratory viruses have zoonotic reservoirs, the design and implementation of effective control
strategies are increasingly important. It has been suggested that
avoiding direct contact with animals known to be zoonotic reservoirs for these viruses is one potential strategy (50); however,
in populations where contact at the human–animal interface is
common this may not be an acceptable solution.
Complex disease problems cannot be solved by one institution or one discipline; as such, this presents opportunities to
incorporate the One Health approach of working across disciplines to incorporate human, animal, and environmental health
to solve complex problems. Although some of the respiratory
viruses described here are found almost exclusively in humans
(Ad strains), many of the most important emerging respiratory
viruses are found at the human/animal interface. This suggests
that strategies for novel virus detection should incorporate global
surveillance at the human–animal interface to detect potentially emerging zoonotic viruses. This surveillance will require

Ad Outbreaks

Outbreaks of respiratory Ad infection are common in both
military recruits and other large training groups, such as police
trainees. Large persistent epidemics of Ad type 4-associated
respiratory disease have been documented in various military
trainees (41–43).
In response to the increased disease burden from Ad4 and Ad7
in military recruits, Teva has made a vaccine available to military
recruits in USA (42). Despite a 12-year hiatus from use, in late
2011 oral Ad4 and Ad7 vaccines were reintroduced as an infection
control measure for military recruits (42). After reintroduction,
military recruits experienced a 100-fold decline in Ad disease
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collaboration and cooperation among many stakeholders in
order to address emerging and novel viral diseases.

and refine the interpretation of the results. All the authors
reviewed the final version of the manuscript and agreed to its
submission.
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